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FAMILY LAW-Volid v. Volid, Reconsideration of the

Role of the Antenuptial Agreement in Illinois.
The Appellate Court of Illinois has proffered fresh consideration of
the scope and effect of antenuptial agreements in the case of Volid v.
Volid. 1 Peter Volid, an extremely wealthy and established business
man, married Rita Wilkes, a long time school teacher, on December
31, 1965. The parties and their representative counsel executed an
antenuptial agreement establishing the rights of the Volids in the
event of divorce or separation.' In 1969 Peter Volid filed a com3
plaint for divorce alleging mental cruelty on the part of his wife.
Rita Volid filed a counterclaim for separate maintenance and at the
preliminary hearing asked the court for an order allowing temporary
alimony and support during the pendency of the litigation.'
Mr.
Volid asserted that the antenuptial agreement should fix the amount of
temporary alimony allowable. The trial court did not consider the
antenuptial agreement in setting temporary alimony and Peter Volid
appealed from that order. The Appellate Court of Illinois considered
the antenuptial agreement, found it controlling, and held that the temporary alimony should be deducted from the lump sum payable pursuant to the agreement. 5 Additionally, the court found that upon entry of a decree of divorce or separate maintenace the payments of alimony or support should not exceed the amount designated in the
antenuptial agreement.'
The Supreme Court of Illinois denied Rita
Volid's petition for leave to appeal.
The decision of the Volid Court has had an unsettling effect upon
Illinois family law. For the first time in this jurisdiction it has been
held that an antenuptial agreement may regulate alimony and support
both before and after the entry of a decree of divorce or separate
maintenance. An award of pre-decree and post-decree alimony and
support in an amount determined by antenuptial contract is not found
1.
2.
duced
3.
4.
5.
6.

Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972).
Id. at 387-88, 286 N.E.2d at 43-44. Paragraph four of the agreement is reproin relevant part in this article at pp. 502-03 infra.
Illinois Divorce Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1 (1969).
Illinois Divorce Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 16 (1969).
6 Ill. App. 3d at 393, 286 N.E.2d at 48.
Id.
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in Illinois precedent and was previously considered contrary to public
policy. The decision has impact on the status of a number of family
law concepts. For example, such issues as the court's discretion to
award alimony and support and the common law duty of the husband
to support his wife are now subject to reevaluation and new interpretation. The ramifications of the Volid opinion are numerous and, as
yet, not fully apparent. It should be noted that most antenuptial
agreements previously considered in Illinois have concerned the disposition of property and the regulation of marital rights pursuant to the death
of a spouse. Recently, agreements such as the one in Volid have sought
to regulate the spouses' rights in relation to separation or divorce. The
majority of courts, albeit public policy considerations which would render
the Volid-type agreement void, have mainly applied precedent involving
the "Death" agreements when construing the "Divorce and Separation" agreements. It is possible that the Volid Court sought a more
progressive approach to the interpretation of antenuptial agreements
in light of the enhanced status of women under the law. In so doing,
however, the court found that it had to deal with precedent based
upon a dissimilar type of antenuptial agreement and public policy
based upon a less enlightened view of the role of the female. The
motive of the court was commendable and its interpretation of the
law of Illinois and other jurisdictions enabled it to achieve a desirable
result. The court in Volid created new law in Illinois and advocated
a view shared by only two other jurisdictions. 7 However, the court
distinguished established precedent on the facts and closely analyzed
the language of the Volid antenuptial contract to achieve its decision.
Perhaps a more direct and open approach to the fact that the court
was significantly altering its view of the purposes of the antenuptial
agreement would have clarified the uncertainties attendant to this holding. An evaluation of Volid must commence with a review of case
law and other writings related to antenuptial agreements in general.
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS

Under the common law the wife's legal interests merged into those
of the husband, thereby eliminating the spouses' capacity to contract
between themselves during marriage.8 The marriage itself vitiated
7. See Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970); and Hudson v. Hudson, 350
P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960).
8. 1 LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS (Rev.
Ed. 1967), § 3, p. 3-8. (hereinafter cited as LINDEY).
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any preexisting agreements between husband and wife.' At common
law there were two principal means of enforcing contracts between
the spouses. Recourse could be had in equity through specific performance when the husband and wife were the actual parties to the
contract, 10 and suits for damages were permitted when trustees were
named by the spouses as substitute parties to the agreement." Today,
due in part to the Enabling Acts of the states, 2 it is settled that antenuptial agreements are not voided by marriage and the common law
remedies are no longer necessary."
This is not to say that the law
had taken a totally enlightened approach to the antenuptial contract.
Indeed, most case law cited as applicable to these agreements originated in a social climate which defined rigid roles of dominance for
the male and passivity for the female.' 4 The courts have generally
taken a paternalistic interest in the rights and welfare of the woman.' 5
The Volid decision appears to emphasize that the female should not
receive special treatment by the courts but should be evaluated on
her merits as a functional member of society. This attitude is in line
with progressive social thought on the role of the modem woman.
The Supreme Court of Florida in Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio 6 explained the general criteria for determining the validity of antenuptial
agreements contemplating a distribution of property after death.' 7
The court said that the agreement must contain a fair and reasonable
provision for the wife coupled with an honest disclosure of the husband's assets.' 8 If such a fair and reasonable disclosure is absent, the
court stated that there must have been a showing by the husband that
the wife possessed a general knowledge of his worth before the contract
can be condoned.' 9
The courts have consistently found those agreements which attempt
9.
10.
11.
12.

2 LINDEY, § 90, p. 90-24.
Warner v. Warner, 235 Ill. 448, 85 N.E. 630 (1908).
See, e.g., Note, 15 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1902).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 6 (1971).
Originally, The Enabling Act of 1874, R.S.
STAT. 1874, p. 576, as amended in Laws 1921, p. 473, § 1 (1921).
The statute allows
a wife to make contracts and incur liability as if she were unmarried.
The statute has been construed to apply to contracts between husband and wife. See, e.g.,
Heiser v. Sutter, 195 111. 378, 73 N.E. 269 (1905).
13. 2 LINDEY, § 90, p. 90-24.
14. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17, 21 (Fla. 1962). See also Cathey,
Antenuptial Agreements in Arkansas-A Drafter's Problem, 24 ARK. L. REV. 275
(1970).
15. See, e.g., Boyer, Equal Opportunity for Women-In Our Time, 56 WOMEN'S L.J.
5 (1970); Seidenburg, Submissive Majority: Modern Trends in the Law Concerning
Women's Rights, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 262 (1970).
16. 143 So.2d at 20.
17. See 2 LINDEY, § 90.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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to regulate the parties' rights concomitant with divorce or separation
void as against public policy.2" Exemplary of the types of agreements determined void ab initio by the nation's judiciary are those
providing for waiver of support by the parties upon separation or
divorce, 21 waiver of the alimony privilege, 2 2 and pre-determination of
the elements of alimony or support payments. 23 The rationale for
these nearly uncompromising rejections of agreements in contemplation of marital dissolution, mentioned in the Volid14 opinion, has
been that the contracts tend to encourage divorce or separation, 25 and
also allow the husband to relieve himself of the duty to support his
wife 26 with the resulting possibility that the wife will become a charge
of the state. 2 7 This reasoning has been accepted by the majority of
28
those courts considering antenuptial agreements.
Recently, however, the rigid acceptance of this rationale has been
subject to modification in some jurisdictions. 2
The more flexible
approach to the pre-marital contract may be related to judicial recognition of the ascending status of women. 0 Not only has this reasoning been accepted by the Illinois Appellate Court in Vlid, 3 1 but also
in another progressive Illinois family law case, Tan v. Tan.12 The encouragement of female equality is laudable, but a court desiring to
facilitate this goal cannot be unresponsive to accepted principles of
domestic law and contract interpretation. The Volid decision has al20. E.g., Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964); Fricke v.
Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 217 Ga. 234, 123
S.E.2d 115 (1961); Watson v. Watson, 37 Ind. App. 548, 77 N.E. 355 (1906). Contra,
Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla.
1960).
21. Note, 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 175 (1971), citing e.g., Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md.
470, 121 A.2d 704 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
22. Id. at 176, citing e.g., Benjamin v. Benjamin, 302 N.Y. 560, 96 N.E.2d 618, 97
N.Y.S.2d 196 (1951).
23. Id., citing e.g., Stratton v. Wilson, 170 Ky. 61, 185 S.W. 522 (1916); Werlien
v. Werlien, 27 Wis. 2d 237, 133 N.W.2d 820 (1965); Annot., 70 A.LR. 826 (1931).
24. Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972).
25. Watson v. Watson, 37 Ind. App. at 550, 77 N.E. at 356. See also Annot., 57
A.LR.2d 943 (1958).

26.

E.g., Warner v. Warner, 235 I11.448, 85 N.E. 630 (1908); Sobel v. Sobel, 92 N.J.

Eq. 376, 132 A. 603 (E & A 1926).

27.
28.
29.

Laleman v. Crombez, 6 Il. 2d 194, 199, 127 N.E.2d 489, 491 (1955).
2 LINDEY, § 90.
Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596

(Okla. 1960); Compare Reiling v. Reiling, -

Ore. -,

474 P.2d 327 (1970).

In Posner

the Court found that an antenuptial agreement which regulated alimony was permissible
if it conformed to strict standards of fairness. 233 So.2d at 385. In Hudson the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld an antenuptial agreement in which the parties waive alimony rights. 350 P.2d at 598.
30. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla. 1962). See note 14 supra.
31. Volid v. Volid, 6 I11.App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972).
32. Tan v. Tan, 3 I11.App. 3d 671, 279 N.E.2d 486 (1972). In this case which
allowed termination of alimony due to a demonstrable change of circumstances by
the husband, the court said, ". . . [W]e take judicial notice of the recent emancipation
of women socially and economically, and particularly in the area of employment." Id.
at 674, 279 N.E.2d at 488.
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tered the acknowledged standards of Illinois family law and previous
judicial interpretation of public policy in search of more progressive
33
law.
The Illinois Supreme Court set forth the general rules concerning
the regulation of marital rights at death by antenuptial agreement in
Seuss v. Schukat:"4
Persons competent to contract may execute a valid antenuptial
agreement. . . . Although the law prescribes the rights of a husband and a wife in the property of each other, persons possessing
the requisite legal capacity may, by such agreement made in contemplation of marriage exclude the operation of the law and determine for themselves what rights they will have in each other's property during the marriage and after its termination by death ...
Antenuptial agreements are not against public policy but, on the
contrary, if freely and intelligently made, are regarded as generally
conducive to marital tranquility and the avoidance of disputes concerning property. 5
The general caveats to an antenuptial agreement were reiterated by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Warner v. Warner. 6 The Warner case involved an antenuptial agreement which provided for both the disposition of
property rights upon death and a specific amount of support for the
wife during the marriage. The court said that there must be an adequate provision for the wife and a full and fair diclosure of the husband's worth, or, if the disclosure is insufficient, a demonstration
37
that the wife had a substantial knowledge of the husband's assets.
The Warner court concluded that the husband cannot contract away
his duty to support his wife during the marriage."' Illinois had not
ruled on whether an antenuptial agreement could regulate post-decree
support or alimony until the Volid opinion. In order to evaluate the
Valid court's use of Illinois and foreign precedent, the antenuptial
agreement which provoked the decision should be examined on the
basis of general rules of contract construction.
THE ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT IN

Volid

Contract Interpretation
Parties competent to contract may execute a valid antenuptial agreement concerning the disposition of property at death in Illinois. 9 In
33. See generally Hayes, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Antenuptial
Agreements, 42 ILL. Bkx J. 212 (1953).
34. Seuss v. Schukat, 358 Ill. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934).
35. Id. at 33-4, 192 N.E. at 671.
36. Warner v. Warner, 235 I1. 448, 85 N.E. 630 (1908).
37. Id. at 469, 85 N.E. at 636 citing e.g., Murdock v. Murdock, 219 Ill. 123, 76
N.E. 57 (1905). See also Van Koten v. Van Koten, 323 Il. 323, 154 N.E. 146 (1926).
38. 235 Ill. at 470, 85 N.E. at 638.
39. Seuss v. Schukat, 358 I11. 27, 33, 192 N.E. 668, 671 (1934).

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 4: 497

Genung v. Hageman40 the Illinois Appellate Court stated that the rules
of contract construction and interpretation applied with equal force
to antenuptial agreements. 4
In Genung the court reviewed the
language of an antenuptial agreement to see if the document served
to waive certain marital rights. The court stated that the agreement
should be viewed in its entirety, with regard to its scope and attendant
circumstances in order to ascertain the intention of the parties.4 2 An
antenuptial contract will affect the marital rights of the parties only if
it is clear that the parties intended the agreement to have that result.4" A right in a spouse's estate can be renounced, without specific language to that effect, so long as the wording of the agreement is sufficient to demonstrate the intention of the parties to relinquish that
right.44 Furthermore, the courts have held that the marriage or the
waiver of marital rights are equally valuable and sufficient consideration for the antenuptial agreement.4 5
The Volid court determined that payments of temporary alimony
should be deducted from the amount of settlement specified by the
antenuptial agreement. 46 The court thereby held that temporary alimony fell within the purview of the contract. It is difficult to understand the holding of the court in view of the contract language set
forth in paragraph four of the Volid agreement. The relevant terms
of paragraph four state:
The parties hereto agree that in the event that a Decree of Divorce
or Separate Maintenance shall be entered in a proceeding between
them, First Party (Peter Volid) may have an obligation under such
decree to pay reasonable alimony or support to Second Party (Rita
Volid). In the event a Decree so provides it is agreed that the First
Party shall pay to Second Party as and for equitable lump sum
settlement in lieu of all rights to alimony or support, and in lieu of
all property rights, if any, and in settlement of her rights, if any, of
dower, homestead, inheritance, and all and every other such right
which may have arisen as a result of their marriage . . . the sum
of FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($50,000.00) ....
[I]f such Decree shall be entered within three (3) years from the
date hereof; if such Decree shall be entered on a date more than
three (3) years from the date hereof, then First Party shall pay to
40. 103 111. App. 2d 409, 414, 242 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1968).
41. Id., citing Guhl v. Guhl, 376 Ill. 100, 33 N.E.2d 185 (1941); Van Cura v.
Drangelis, 43 Ill. App. 2d 205, 193 N.E.2d 201 (1963).
42. Id.
43. Id., citing Baugham v. Baugham, 283 Ill. 55, 119 N.E. 59 (1918).
44. Id., citing Collins v. Phillips, 259 Il1. 405, 102 N.E. 796 (1913).
45. E.g., Seuss v. Schukat, 358 I11. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934); Kroell v. Kroell, 219
Ill. 105, 76 N.E. 63 (1905).
46. 6 Ill. App. 3d at 393, 286 N.E.2d at 48.
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Second Party as and for a lump sum settlement in lieu of the rights
referred to above, the sum of SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($75,000.00) payable at the rate of SIX HUNDRED
DOLLARS ($600.00) per month for One Hundred Twenty-five
(125) successive months, commencing one (1) month after the
entry of such Decree...

The parties further agree that the purpose of this paragraph 4 are to
promote marital harmony and to discourage either party from obtaining monetary benefits by breach of the marital relationship
and
47
the institution of a legal proceedings for separation or divorce.
The plain meaning of the agreement is that the alimony or support
payments were to be made subsequent to a decree of divorce or separate maintenance. Nevertheless, the Volid court chose to base its
interpretation of the agreement on the last paragraph of paragraph
four. The court seized upon this final statement of purpose to assert
that an award of temporary alimony in excess of the contract amount
would unjustly enrich Rita Volid . 4
The determination of the court
rested upon two assumptions. First, it assumed that the parties intended that this contract would apply to temporary alimony. Second,
it assumed that an antenuptial agreement is a valid means to regulate
temporary alimony or support.
The court's first assumption is initially weakened by the specific
language in the agreement calling for post-decree support only. The
design of the purpose statement was simply "to discourage either party
from obtaining monetary benefits by a breach of the marital relationship". However, the court found that this language indicated that
the payments of alimony, either temporary or permanent, were not
meant to exceed the lump sum amount granted in the agreement.
Application of the rules of contract construction listed earlier makes
the foregoing interpretation dubious. In order to ascertain the inten49
tion of the parties, the agreement must be viewed in its entirety.
Such an examination reveals a contrast between the specificity of the
language in the bulk of paragraph four and the vagueness and generality of the purpose statement. As previously noted an antenuptial
agreement will affect the marital rights of the parties only if it is their
47. 6 Ill. App. 3d at 387-88, 286 N.E.2d at 43-44 [emphasis added]. It is interesting that neither the court nor the respective litigants mentioned the language of the agreement which provided that the lump sum settlement would be "in lieu of all rights to alimony or support, and in lieu of all property rights, if any, and in settlement of her
rights, if any, of dower, homestead, inheritance, and all and every other such right
which may have arisen as a result of their marriage .... ." This catch-all phraseology may have lent support to the court's interpretation of the contract.
48. 6 I11.App. 3d at 389, 286 N.E.2d at 45.
49.

See note 42 supra.
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clear intention that the agreement do so.5 0 This rule militates against
the court's interpretation that the purpose statement shows intent to
regulate temporary alimony. A right in a spouse's estate may be renounced so long as the wording of the agreement is sufficient to
demonstrate the intention of the parties to relinquish that right.5 '
This standard, however, offers little support to the court's interpretation, because the right to temporary alimony or support is not a common law right of the spouse's estate, but is a right granted by statute. 2
Furthermore, the wording of the purpose statement does not demonstrate the Volid's clear intention that the right to temporary alimony
or support, which has always been controlled by the courts,53 was to
be replaced by the terms of the antenuptial agreement.
The burden of proving the validity and application of the pre-marital contract rests upon the party who asserts it. 5 4 Further, the contract
is construed most strictly against the party who drafts it. 5" The court
accepted the interpretation of Peter Volid, whose counsel drafted" the
agreement; it did so in spite of the rules of contract interpretation to
the contrary. The court held that an award of temporary alimony or
support in addition to the lump sum contract amount would grant
Rita Volid more than the amount agreed upon by the parties. This
reasoning begs the question of whether the antenuptial agreement is
the proper means to regulate temporary alimony or support.57 The
issue is, in fact, whether the parties intended the agreement to apply
to temporary alimony. The wording, however, would seem to indicate that the parties did not so intend. Therefore, Mrs. Volid could
receive temporary alimony or support and still be entitled to the total
amount granted as a lump sum by the antenuptial agreement. 8
The analysis of the Volid contract's language was insufficient in itself to support the holding of the court but is demonstrative of the
court's desire to achieve what it deems a fair and proper result. In
review of the contractual construction of the antenuptial agreement,
the second assumption-that a pre-marital contract was a valid instru50. See note 43, supra.
51. See note 44, supra.

52.

Illinois Divorce Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 16 (1971).
53. id.
54. Seuss v. Schukat, 358 111. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934); Dean v. Dean, 286 111. 23,
121 N.E. 234 (1918).
55. E.g., Cedar Park Cemetery v. Village of Calumet Park, 398 Ill. 324, 333, 75
N.E.2d 874, 879 (1947).
56. Petitioner's Brief for Rehearing at 14, Volid v. Volid, 6 IlL App. 3d 386, 286
N.E.2d 42 (1972).
57. id. at 15.
58. Id.
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ment for the disposition of temporary alimony and support-was critical
to the court's position. The validity of such an agreement could not
have been easily assumed in light of established precedent. The
court's ready desire to make the assumption indicates a desire to move
beyond the boundaries of previous case law rather than merely distinguish them on their facts. A study of Illinois and foreign precedent
is necessary to test the court's premise.
Validity of the Agreement-Temporary Alimony
The Volid court stated that there was little doubt as to the voluntary nature of the transaction.5 9 The agreement states in the preamble and in paragraph eight that the parties were represented by counsel
and were aware of the relevant rights and facts at issue.6 ° In the Volid antenuptial contract the standards set forth in Del Vecchio v. Del
Vecchio, 61 have been satisfied 62 , i.e., a fair and reasonable provision
for the wife; a complete and honest disclosure of the husband's worth;
or an implied knowledge of the husband's property by the wife.6"
Antenuptial agreements which comply with these standards are, gen64
erally, in harmony with public policy.
The contested issue was whether an antenuptial agreement is valid to
control temporary alimony or support. The court noted Rita Volid's
contention that antenuptial agreements which limit temporary alimony
or support have never been enforced in Illinois. 6" The court, nonetheless, distinguished Mrs. Volid's precedents-Van Koten v. Van
Koten, Berge v. Berge, and Threw v. Threw66-- on two grounds.
59. 6 I11.App. 3d at 389, 286 N.E.2d at 44.
60. Brief of Appellant at 13. Volid v. Volid, 6 Il1. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42
(1972). The brief reprints the terms of the antenuptial agreement in relevant part:
WHEREAS, both parties hereto have been advised by legal counsel concerning this Agreement, their repespective rights hereunder, and their prospective
rights and obligations as husband and wife under the law;" and further provides in paragraph eight, "Each of the parties hereto has made a full and complete disclosure to the other of the assets owned by such party at the present
time, and the waiver, release, and relinquishment of the rights of each party,
as herein above set forth, has been made with full knowledge of the extent of
wealth of the other party. A schedule of all of the properties, real, personal,
and mixed, now owned by First Party (Peter Volid) and the estimated
values thereof and a statement of his income have been examined by the Second Party (Rita Volid) and her Attorney.
61. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17, 21 (Fla. 1962).
62. While a full disclosure of Peter Volid's wealth is suggested here, a large number
of Illinois cases hold that such knowledge may be attributed to the wife from the relevant factual situation. See, e.g., Megginson v. Megginson, 367 11. 168, 10 N.E.2d 815
(1937).
63. See generally Note, 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 175 (1971).
64. Seuss v. Schukat, 358 Ill. 27, 33-34, 192 N.E. 668, 671 (1934).
65. 6 111. App. 3d at 389, 286 N.E.2d at 45.
66. Van Koten v. Van Koten, 323 Ill. 323, 154 N.E. 146 (1926); Berge v. Berge,
366 Ill. 228, 8 N.E.2d 623 (1937); Threw v. Threw, 410 I1. 107, 101 N.E.2d 515
(1957).
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First, the agreements in these cases were made during marriage, and,
second, the husbands attempted to avoid the duty of support. 67 The
court emphasized that the Volid agreement was made before marriage and that Peter Volid in no way attempted to avoid the duty to
support his wife.68
The Van Koten and Threw cases concerned situations in which the
husband and wife contracted for a lump sum provision for the wife to
be payable during the marriage in abrogation of all other support."0
This contractual arrangement is analogous to the Volid agreement in
that the Volid contract controls temporary alimony which constitutes
Rita Volid's complete support while the parties are still married during
the litigation period. The Volid court inaccurately distinguished these
cases as exemplary of avoidance of support compared with the adequate support provided by the agreement before it. The amount of support to be given by the husband has never been the controlling factor; the
central issue has always been that a contract between the spouses has
attempted to control support during marriage as the Supreme Court
of Illinois in Van Koten pointed out:
[H]usband and wife may contract with each other as to their
mutual property rights [inheritance and dower], but the husband
cannot by contract, either before or after marriage, relieve himself
of the obligation imposed upon him by the law to support his wife,
and a contract between husband and wife one of the material provisions of which is that the husband shall be relieved of the obligation imposed upon him by law to support his wife is illegal and void
70
as being contrary to public policy ....
The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Warner v. Warner,"
wherein an antenuptial agreement providing for a definite amount of
support during marriage was construed, indicates further infirmity in
the court's position. The relationship of Warner to Valid is based
upon the premise that support during marriage is in no way different
from payment of temporary alimony or support pendente lite. The
Warner court stated that in so far as a husband would attempt to bind
himself to a specific amount of support during marriage, he took
upon himself an obligation that was unenforceable at law." In Valid
the agreement was found controlling of the amount of temporary ali67.

Volid v. Volid, 6 IlM. App. 3d at 390, 286 N.E.2d at 45.

68. Id.

69.
410 I11.
70.
71.
72.

Van Koten v. Van Koten, 323 Ill. 323, 154 N.E. 668 (1926), Threw v. Threw,
107, 101 N.E.2d 515 (1957).
323 IlL at 326-27, 154 N.E. at 147.
Warner v. Warner, 235 I11.448, 85 N.E. 630 (1908).
Id. at 469, 85 N.E. at 636.
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mony to be paid as distinguished from an amount established at the
discretion of the court. Prior to Valid, the law cast a duty of support
upon the husband, and a contract providing for the regulation of support was clearly void as against public policy under Warner.7 3
The Valid court attempted to distinguish the marital situation in
Warner from the situation before it. The Volid court termed the
Warner marital relation a "functioning family" wherein an antenuptial
agreement would not be applicable.7 1 In Volid the court viewed the
parties as having reached "a time when the marital relationship has
broken down", hence making an antenuptial agreement permissible.75
Clearly, Peter and Rita Volid were still married at the time the court
sought to apply the agreement. Consequently, any agreement which
modifies the duty to support the wife while the parties are awaiting
the entry of a final decree of divorce or separate maintenance is support during marriage and void under the language of Warner.76 The
approach taken by the Valid court to demonstrate that an antenuptial
agreement may regulate temporary alimony and support did not emphasize the full impact of the Warner decision. It was, however,
consistent with the progressive theme of sexual equality in domestic
law prevalent in the opinion.
Validity of the Agreement-PermanentAlimony
There is no Illinois law on this specific issue, for as noted earlier
most antenuptial agreements construed by courts involved disposition
of property and marital rights upon the death of a spouse. The
court, therefore, looked to authority from other jurisdictions and
noted that contracts between spouses which attempted to limit or eliminate support after the entry of a divorce or separate maintenance decree are generally disapproved.7 7 The Valid court reviewed the reasons given for such holdings. First, the state has an interest in preserving the marriage and would not approve of contracts which tend
to facilitate or induce separation or divorce.78 Second, the state has
an interest in seeing that a married woman does not become a charge
of the state after divorce or separation due to a lack of support. 9
73. Id.
74. 6 Ill. App. 3d at 390, 286 N.E.2d at 46.
75. Id.
76. Warner v. Warner, 235 111. 448, 85 N.E. 630 (1908).
77. 6 IlL App. 3d at 390, 286 N.E.2d at 46. See, e.g., Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.
App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500
(1950).
78. E.g., Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W. 2d 288 (1964).
79. E.g., Laleman v. Crombez, 6 Il. 2d 194, 127 N.E.2d 489 (1955).
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After giving brief recognition to these reasons, the court re-emphasized the changes occurring in contemporary attitudes toward the marital relationship and in family law generally. The court reasoned
that state interest did not require the continuation of a broken marriage s° and that the grounds for divorce were becoming more expansive."' Furthermore, the court said that where the parties are independent and established the interest of the state in the- continuation
of the marriage is small.8 " The reasoning of the dissenting Justice in
the Wisconsin case of Fricke v. Fricke8 3 was favorably received by the
Volid court. In that opinion the dissent stated that an antenuptial
agreement should not be considered discordant to the marital relationship; on the contrary, such contracts serve to add predictability and
stability to the marriage as do contracts in other areas of human acs
tivity.a
The court in Volid continued its rationale of a more enlightened approach to antenuptial agreements by recognizing that some marital
rights may be relinquished by agreement before or after the wedding, 5
and that the right to support can be terminated after a divorce decree.8 6 Therefore, the court stated that it would be anomalous to
argue that the parties could not provide a plan within an antenuptial
agreement which would anticipate divorce or separation and allocate
7
the respective rights of the spouses accordingly.
Since the court resorts to the extension of more limited case law
and statutory authority to achieve its progressive approach, it concedes
that the issue of regulation of permanent alimony or support by antenuptial contract has not been previously determined by Illinois courts.
It is true that some rights of the spouses in each other's property may
be waived by antenuptial agreement.8 8 However, any attempt to regulate alimony or support by such agreement has been rejected by
the majority of other jurisdictions.8 ' Furthermore, that aspect of the
80. 6 Ill. App. 3d at 391, 286 N.E.2d at 46.
81. See, e.g., Goldstein and Gilter, On Abolition of Grounds for Divorce: A Model
Statute and Commentary, 3 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1969).
82. 6 Ill. App. 3d at 391, 286 N.E.2d at 46. But cf. Reynolds v. Reynolds 217 Ga.
234, 123 S.E.2d 115 (1961).
83. Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
84. Id.

85.

See Seuss v. Schukat, 358 111. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934), concerning the waiver of

dower and inheritance rights.

And see Laleman v. Crombez, 6 Ill. 2d 194, 127 N.E.2d

489 (1955), concerning the waiver of property rights in a separation agreement.

86. Illinois Divorce Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 § 19 (1971).
And see Canady v.
Canady, 30 Ill. 2d 440, 197 N.E.2d 42 (1964), which discusses the type of settlement
proposed under the statute.
87. 6 Ill. App. 3d at 392, 286 N.E.2d at 47.
88. See note 85, supra.
89. See note 77, supra.
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court's reasoning concerned with the power to terminate support after
a decree or divorce was inappropriate here. Such power is statutory
in Illinois and is for use by the courts in their equitable discretion."0
The matter is not left for private parties to determine by contract.
There are, nonetheless, recent cases from other jurisdictions which
support the Volid court's conclusion that an antenuptial agreement
entered into freely and without fraud may regulate the rights of the
parties upon entry of a decree of divorce or separate maintenance. 9 1
Hudson v. Hudson9 2 is an Oklahoma case in which a woman challenged the validity of an antenuptial contract upon divorce. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a just and reasonable antenuptial
agreement in which the parties waived the right to alimony in the
event of divorce was valid. 9 In like manner, the Supreme Court of
Florida held in Posner v. Posner94 that an antenuptial agreement setting property rights and alimony would be valid if it conformed to the
stringent rules prescribed for such agreements. 9 5 Furthermore, the
Posner court emphasized that the antenuptial contract is subject to
review and modification by the court as authorized by Florida statute. 90
These decisions supported the Volid court's rationale for a more
enlightened approach to the validity of all antenuptial agreements. In
truth, these decisions represent a distinct minority view of the jurisdictions dealing with such agreements. In addition, the Volid decision
is more expansive than either Hudson or Posner. Hudson, while upholding the novel concept of determination of post-decree alimony by
antenuptial agreement, did not consider the important Volid issue of
temporary alimony.9 7 Posner provided strict standards by which to
judge the validity of the proposed agreement and allowed future review and modification by the court. 98 Volid implied neither of the important conditions set forth in Posner. Further, a recent Florida case
indicates that Posner does not support the Volid court's contention
that an antenuptial contract may control temporary alimony. The
Supreme Court of Florida said in Belcher v. Belcher,99 a case in which
90.
91.
92.

See note 86, supra.
See note 29, supra.
350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960).

93.

Id. at 597.

95.
96.

See note 21, supra.
233 So.2d at 386, citing FLA.

97.
98.

350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960).
233 So2d 381 (Fla. 1970).

99.

271 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1972).

94.

233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
STAT.

§ 61.14 (1965).
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a husband sought to validate an antenuptial agreement determining
temporary alimony, "[that] until there is a decree of dissolution of the
marriage, thus ending her role as wife, the wife's support remains
within the long established guidelines of support by the husband
which cannot be supplanted by his advance summary disposition
agreement."' 10 0 It is apparent, then, that the weight of authority militates against the Volid court's progressive formulation of the antenuptial agreement as it applies to both temporary and permanent alimony
or support. Nonetheless, the enlightened approach of the Volid court
has great merit. The making of new law quite naturally conflicts
with the accepted law and upsets the status quo.
CONCLUSION

The state of family law in Illinois has been unsettled by the Volid
decision. In large part the uncertainty caused by the decision is due
to the court's indirect approach to the creation of a new policy regarding antenuptial agreements. The Volid court distinguished precedent and relied on the vagaries of contract language to reach its
decision rather than directly declaring its intention to create new law
in this area. In summary, the appellate court held that any amounts
to be paid to a wife for temporary alimony or support pending entry
of a decree of divorce or separate maintenance must be deducted from
the lump sum settlement agreed to by the parties in an antenuptial
contract.' 0 ' The court also held that the agreement may control the
determination of permanent alimony or support after the entry of a
decree.' 0 2
It was previously assumed in Illinois that antenuptial agreements
were valid only to convey property or determine limited marital rights
upon the death of a spouse; contracts regulating rights of the parties upon
termination of the marriage in the courts were considered void as
against public policy.'l 0
Therefore, the Volid court's holding with
respect to the application of antenuptial contracts to temporary alimony appears contrary to the duty imposed upon the husband to
support the wife.104 Also, the court's application of the rules of contract interpretation is questionable because the antenuptial agreement
entered into by the Volids did not specifically indicate that the parties
100.

Id. at 11.

101.
102.
103.
104.

6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972).
Id.
See note 33, supra.
E.g., Warner v. Warner, 235 I1. 448, 85 N.E. 630 (1908).
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intended it to apply to temporary alimony or support. 10 5 And, although the court relied upon the Hudson and Posner cases to hold
that an award of permanent alimony or support may be governed by
an antenuptial contract, this position is contrary to the strong majority
view of courts construing antenuptial agreements. 0 6 Perhaps if the
Volid court had openly stated its desire to go beyond traditional precedent the decision would not have appeared so closely related to that
prior case law. Nevertheless, the decision in Volid should not be
noted for its reliance on small factual distinctions in established precedent for its validity but rather should stand apart as a clear statement
of progressive legal opinion. The dicta of the court in Volid showed
most clearly the interest in a progressive approach to the interpretation
of antenuptial agreements. By so reasoning, the court acknowledged
the contemporary standards of sexual equality and the enhanced status
of women. 10 7 This rationale, however, is strictured by the court's employment of traditional case precedent and statutory authority.
Consequently, the exact ramifications of the Volid opinion are not
readily apparent. It is obvious, however, that antenuptial agreements
which attempt to regulate the rights and duties of spouses pursuant
to the dissolution of marriage may no longer be considered void ab
initio as against public policy. The benefits to be gained from the
abandonment of the "contrary to public policy" rule are numerous.
For example, the courts may now recognize that the concept that
women are wholly dependent upon their husbands is antiquated and
simplistic; that the inflexible application of the rule defeats its objectives of promotion and protection of marriage; and that greater freedom
of contract will exist to better effectuate the desires of the parties to
such contracts. 0 8 Therefore, future decisions in this area will be obligated to review such concepts as the lack of state interest in the continuation of the broken marriage, the stability and predictability of the
marriage pursuant to antenuptial contracts, the independence and employability of the contemporary woman, and the frequency and availability of divorce in our society. The recent trend toward more expansive grounds for divorce is indicative of the changing attitude toward
the modern marital relationship. The Volid decision is a part of this
progressive trend in domestic law.
Yet, Volid also created several uncertainties in this field of law. It
105.
106.
107.

108.

See note 53, supra.
See note 20, supra.
6 111. App. 3d at 391, 286 N.E.2d at 46-47.
See Note, 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 175 (1971).
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is questionable if a Volid type agreement would be upheld in a situation where a material change of circumstances during the period between the drafting and the application of the document has taken
place. It is possible that such a change (e.g., a serious illness or an
extreme financial reverse) would render a previously fair and reasonable
contract unconscionable. Also, the exact dimensions of the husband's
duty to support his wife are made unclear by the opinion. The impact of the Volid decision has modified the previous Illinois rule that
the husband has a duty to support his wife after separation and before
the legal termination of the relationship. Furthermore, Volid has affected the discretionary ability of the trial courts to award both temporary and permanent alimony and to review the award at a later
time. Lastly, since the Volid decision arose from a preliminary hearing and order in the lower court, none of the matters unsettled by this
case will be finally clarified until disposition of the case at the trial
level. Therefore, it would be unwise at this time for the practicing attorney to completely rely upon the Volid rationale when drafting
antenuptial contracts. The decision of the appellate court, although
enlightened and welcome, has left unresolved important questions of
law which will have a significant effect upon Illinois domestic relations
policies.
KEiTH EDWARD EMMONS
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